There has been much discussion about tightening credit conditions in the East Asian crisis countries, particularly as nominal and real interest rates rose sharply in the aftermath of the crisis. Beyond the effects of rising interest rates, however, a key concern in light of declining (real) credit to the private sector, was the risk of a "credit crunch", whereby interest rates do not equilibrate supply and demand for credit and there is quantity rationing. In this paper, we allow explicitly for disequilibrium in the credit markets and estimate a credit supply function and a credit demand function. We find evidence of a "credit crunch" in both Indonesia and Korea in late 1997, as the banking system crisis deepened, and the supply of (real) credit declined. Thereafter, however, credit demand also fell sharply as economic recession took hold. By the end of the first quarter of 1998, therefore, although the supply of credit remained considerably lower than pre-crisis levels, the constraining factor was the demand for credit. As such, there is little evidence of a credit crunch at the aggregate level from the first quarter of 1998-although high real interest rates and credit rationing for individual firms may have continued to contribute to difficulties of the corporate sector. JEL Classification Numbers: E44; G21; G28 Keywords: Credit crunch; East Asia Currency Crises.
INTRODUCTION
There has been much discussion about tightening credit conditions in the East Asian crisis countries in the aftermath of the crisis. In Korea, overnight call rates, which had averaged 12 percent prior to the crisis, peaked at 25 percent in the first quarter of 1998, while average lending rates shot up from 12 percent to 18 percent. Real interest rates demonstrated almost the same magnitude of increases, albeit slightly later-peaking during the second quarter of 1998. Both the sharp exchange rate depreciations, andgiven the high leverage ratios of corporates-the rising real interest rates, contributed to corporate sector distress and weakening economic activity. In Indonesia, also, deposit and lending rates shot up as the crisis deepened (though in real interest rates were negative from December 1997 until the third quarter of 1998).
At the same time, there was a sharp decline in (real) credit to the private sector in both countries. This has sparked a debate as to whether (beyond any rise in interest rates) these countries witnessed a "credit crunch"-whereby interest rates failed to equilibrate supply and demand for credit, and there was quantity rationing. Such rationing was all the more likely in view of the lagging increase in real interest rates, and might have occurred as banking system deposits shrunk and banks were forced to hold greater reserves and increase their capital provisioning to meet the more rigorous capital adequacy standards adopted post-crisis.
On the other hand, the weakening aggregate demand and declining production may have lowered the demand for credit as well. As such, the fall in real credit to the private sector may reflect declining demand for credit, contracting supply, or both.
Whether the demand for credit, or the supply of credit, is found to be the binding constraint at a particular point in time would have implications for policy. In particular, evidence of a credit crunch at the aggregate level resulting from a decline in banks' lending capacity might call for the provision of greater liquidity-to the extent that this does not undermine the stability of the exchange rate. If it is the capital constraint that is the binding factor in banks' lending capacity, greater emphasis on bringing capital into the system would need to be the priority. However, the provision of greater capital at the aggregate level would be unlikely to resolve the issue-even if there was a credit crunch-if this credit crunch were not due to a decline in banks' lending capacity, but rather their unwillingness to lend. In that case the prescription would be for initiatives that reduce the uncertainty and increase the information base to encourage banks to be willing to lend to creditworthy borrowers. On the other hand, if demand were the binding constraint (i.e. was lower than the supply of credit), this would presumably be reflecting poor prospects for firms, which would call for even greater emphasis on reflationary fiscal policy to increase aggregate demand. If the demand for credit falls short of the supply at prevailing interest rates, this should normally exert downward pressure on these rates. Lending rates that are found to be downwardly sticky in such a situation would suggest that corporates are facing a risk premium. To the extent that the risk premium is related to overall prospects for firms, policies that improved these prospects would be critical to reducing interest rates. These would include policies directed towards financial and corporate sector restructuring, as well as, at the macro level, reflationary fiscal policy (as this would improve firms' earnings prospects). Finally, to the extent that credit crunch prevails at the sectoral or microeconomic level, schemes that reduce uncertainty and encourage banks to lend to these borrowers, need to be carefully designed.
In this paper, we adopt an explicit disequilibrium framework for analyzing the behavior of real private credit in Korea and Indonesia with a view to assessing whether the supply or demand for credit has been the binding constraint. We estimate a credit supply function-which depends upon interest rates, the commercial banks' lending capacity, and the level of economic activity, and a credit demand function-which depends upon the interest rate and indicators of current and expected economic activity. These estimated functions can be used to determine whether, in any period, it is the supply or demand for credit that is the constraining factor.
Our results may be summarized briefly. In Indonesia, we find evidence of a credit crunch in the third and fourth quarters of 1997. By the end of the first quarter of 1998, however, the deepening recession had led to a sufficient decline in the demand for credit so that decline in actual credit reflected a lack of demand, rather than constrained supply. Similarly in Korea-where the crisis broke a few months later-we find evidence of a credit crunch in the last quarter of 1997, reflecting both a sharp decline in the supply of credit, and an increase in the demand for credit. From the first quarter of 1998 onwards, though, the binding factor was the (lack of) demand: although (as in Indonesia) the supply of credit remained significantly below pre-crisis levels, the demand for credit had declined by even more.
Two points to these findings bear emphasizing. First, the concept of a "credit crunch" refers to a situation in which credit is unavailable at prevailing interest rateshigh real interests themselves of course, impose a burden on borrowers. Second, the results presented here pertain to the aggregate economy-thus even when there is no evidence of a credit crunch at the aggregate level, at the microeconomic level, individual firms that were otherwise creditworthy may well have been unable to obtain capital at prevailing interest rates.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the methodology (and appendix I, the data). Section 3 presents the empirical results. Section 4 offers some brief concluding remarks.
METHODOLOGY
An observed decline in credit is consistent with falling supply of credit, falling demand for credit or both. The key identification problem lies in attributing the observed changes in actual private sector credit to underlying movements of the credit supply and credit demand function. This identification problem is resolved in this paper in a switching regression framework by imposing reasonable a priori exclusion restrictions, such as that the bank's lending capacity affects the supply of credit but does not affect the demand for credit. Moreover, the approach of this paper allows for an explicit distinction to be made between banks' ability to make loans-as captured by their lending capacity and their willingness to make loans, which depends on such factors as interest rates and their perceptions of borrowers' ability to pay and risk The real supply of bank credit is assumed to depend upon the real interest rate, r t , relative to the cost of funds (proxied by the deposit rate); current output y t , as a measure of firms' ability to repay and commercial banks' real lending capacity, l t . It is, of course, quite difficult to gauge the true lending capacity of banks in a crisis and post-crisis context. In general, under circumstances where banks' equity is below that required to meet capital adequacy requirements, banks' lending capacity would be given by the minimum of their liquidity capacity and capital constraint as defined by prevailing rules, i.e. lending capacity = min[liquidity, capital constraint].
Banks' liquidity capacity, in turn, is given by total liabilities minus cash in vault minus required reserves. A conservative estimate of banks' capital constraint would be given by assuming that banks were already attempting to set aside sufficient capital to meet the 8 percent capital adequacy ratio on a risk-weighted basis-even though, in reality, some forbearance may have been taking place. Finally, in order to allow for a structural break in the supply of credit a dummy was included for the respective crisis periods: 1997Q3 onwards for Indonesia and 1997Q4 onwards for Korea.
2 Pazarbasioglu (1997) also uses a disequilibrium model to analyze the banking crisis in Finland. However, the approach of this paper differs in that the lending capacity is taken as an explicit determinant of the supply of bank credit. This allows a distinction to be made between banks' lending capacity on the one hand, and factors that may affect their willingness to lend, at a given lending capacity, on the other. As mentioned in the text, this also helps to reduce the potential problem of identification. For other approaches to the credit crunch see Benarke and Lwon (1992) . 3 In this framework, there can be disequilibrium whenever supply does not equal demand at the prevailing interest rate (for whatever reason), with the quantity traded determined by the short-side of the market. The framework thus does not require a specific model of why there may be credit rationing (e.g. perceived risk by lenders) or excess credit supply. More generally, a dynamic equation determining the evolution of the interest rate to disequilibrium may be specified, although this is not done here. Instead, as a robustness check, the interest rate variables are instrumented (using their own lags). 
Specifying the demand function is more tricky. The need for working capital presumably depends upon production, with higher output requiring greater credit. Greater uncertainty regarding the economic situation and prospects, on the other hand, is likely to reduce the demand. With these considerations in mind, the demand for real credit is assumed to depend upon the real interest (lending) rate, r t ; current output, y t , to capture both working capital requirements and as an indicator for future output; the price of the stock market as a proxy for future expected output, S p ; and the variance of the growth in output y σ , and inflation, π t , both as indicators of the general macroeconomic environment:
The probability that any observation t is supply constrained (i.e. quantity is determined by credit supply) is simply:
where σ s and σ d are the estimated standard errors of the credit supply and credit demand functions and Φ(·) the cumulative Normal distribution function.
If observation t is on the demand function, then C t = C t d < C t s and the density of C t , h(C t ) is given by:
where φ(·) is the joint density of C t d and C t s . Conversely, if in period t there is a credit crunch then, 
As discussed by Maddala (1989) , for certain parameter values the likelihood function may be unbounded, but in practice, we encountered few difficulties in estimation. A more subtle issue concerns the stationarity of the data, since observed real credit (in both countries) exhibits a unit root. In much of the literature on disequilibrium models, the issue of stationarity appears to be ignored and the model estimated in levels (see e.g. Maddala and Nelson (1974), Pazarbasioglu (1997) ). In part, this is because estimation in first differences loses too much information. (Simply put, just because the growth of credit supply exceeds the growth of credit demand, it does not necessarily follow that credit supply is not the binding constraint.) Estimation in levels is legitimate as long as the determinants of credit supply and credit demand form a cointegrating vector. Once the model's parameters have been estimated via maximum likelihood, this can readily be tested by checking whether the implied credit demand, C t d , is cointegrated with observed real credit, C t (and, likewise, that C s is cointegrated with C t ). Since these are cointegrating vectors, however, the reported t-statistics provide a measure of the precision of estimation of individual parameters, rather than of formal statistical "significance."
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The data are quarterly and cover the period 1991:1 to 1998:3; data sources are described in appendix 1. Based on these quarterly data, it is not possible to reject a unit root in real private sector credit for either of the countries, with Augmented DickeyFuller test statistics ranging from about -1.97 in Korea to -2.1 in Indonesia. Accordingly, it is useful to check that, for each country, the determinants of the credit supply (demand) function form a co-integrating vector with observed real private sector credit. These tests are based on the Reimers small-sample correction of the Johansen statistics (with 95 percent critical values for the maximum eigenvalue and the trace given by 14.1 and 15.4 respectively). For Indonesia, both credit supply and credit demand are found to be cointegrated with actual real private sector credit. For Korea, the trace statistic readily rejects the hypothesis that the rank of the cointegrating vector is zero (ρ=0) for both credit supply and credit demand, but the maximum eigenvalue is just below the critical value for credit demand at λ max = 13.7 4 . Table 1 reports the parameter estimates for Indonesia. All coefficients are of the expected signs in the credit supply function, except for the dummy, which is also not statistically significant. The coefficients on both the interest rate and output are significant at the 10 percent level.
All coefficients are of the expected signs in the credit demand function as well. The coefficient on output is highly significant, with higher output associated with higher credit demand. Higher interest rates are associated with lower real credit demand, as expected, although the coefficient is not significant. The stock market price is also positively related to real credit demand and is significant at the 5 percent level. Finally, both the variance in output growth and inflation-taken as indicators of the general macroeconomic environment-are negatively related with real credit demand, as expected, with the former statistically significant at the 5 percent level. Table 2 reports the estimates for Korea. In the credit supply function, the coefficients on both the lending capacity and output are of the expected signs and highly significant. Neither the coefficient on interest rates nor the dummy are of the expected signs, but again, neither are statistically significant.
In the credit demand function, the coefficient on output is positive as expected, and is highly significant, while that on the interest rate is negative and is marginally significant. The coefficient on the variance of output growth is also of the expected sign and is also marginally significant. Neither the coefficient on stockmarket prices, nor that on inflation, are of the expected signs (both are negatively correlated with real credit demand), but neither are statistically significant. (The negative coefficient on stock market prices, in any case, may reflect two opposing factors at work. A high stock market price may portend buoyant economic conditions and therefore a greater need for credit to provide working capital as enterprises expand production. On the other hand, if stock prices are high, firms may be better positioned to tap the capital markets directly).
As a robustness check, to correct for potential endogenity of the interest rate variables, these were instrumented using two lags of the respective variables. The parameter estimates and resulting supply and demand functions were found to be very similar to those reported here.
Given these estimated credit supply and credit demand functions, the probability that there is a supply-side credit crunch is given by θ t , while the extent of the (supplyside) credit crunch is given by (
. If the estimated supply and estimated demand are sufficiently close, then the market is essentially in equilibrium, and the probability that it is ether supply or demand "constrained" will be close to 50 percent. In fact, the magnitude of the deviations are found to be usually quite large, so that when C t d > C t s , the probability that supply was indeed the constraining factor is high (i.e. above 95 percent) and vice versa. Figure 1 shows the estimated supply and credit demand functions, as well as actual credit to the private sector. The overall fit of the model may be judged by the correspondence between the actual private sector credit and the minimum of the contemporaneous credit supply and demand functions.
As can be seen from Figure 1 , in Indonesia there is evidence of excess demandi.e. a credit crunch-in the third and fourth quarters of 1997-amounting to 9 percent and 13 percent respectively. Although the demand for credit fell in the fourth quarter, the contraction in the supply of credit was sharper. However, the situation had reversed by the second quarter of 1998, when the demand for credit had fallen off by much more than the supply.
In Korea, too, we find evidence of a credit crunch at the end of 1997. The demand for credit rose in the fourth quarter of 1997, while the supply declined sharply-entailing excess demand of around 7 percent. The fact that the demand for credit rose is not surprising-in the face of what may be perceived as temporary difficulties, firms' demand for credit is likely to rise 5 . However, by the end of the first quarter of 1998, the demand for credit had fallen off sufficiently, so that the supply of credit was no longer the binding constraint. The demand for credit decreased by almost 9 percent in the first quarter, and further by 2 percent in the second quarter, presumably reflecting the severity of the economic downturn and the extent of corporate distress that had already occurred. It bears emphasizing that the results of this paper pertain at the aggregate level and to the aggregate economy. Thus no distinction is made in the supply of credit between credit that is rolled over and the provision of new credit. Clearly, the provision of fresh lending is a key element for the restoration of firms' health. Also, even when there is no evidence of quantity rationing at the aggregate level, at the microeconomic level, individual firms that are otherwise creditworthy may well have found that their demand for credit at prevailing interest rates was unmet. In particular, smaller firms are likely to be more prone to a credit crunch arising from informational problems. In Korea, for example, the Credit Bureau of the Korea Federation of Banks only collects credit information on borrowers with loans above a certain threshold, which excludes most Small and Medium Enterprises. Thus SMEs that were primarily dependent on the weaker banks prior to the crisis, would have found it difficult-once they were cut off from these weak banks-to establish a credit record with stronger banks that were more flush with liquidity and or less capital constrained.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we examine whether a credit crunch-defined as a situation in which there is excess demand for credit at prevailing interest rates-developed in the aftermath of the East Asian currency crises. The paper uses a disequilibrium framework for analyzing the behavior of real private credit in Indonesia and Korea, with a view to assessing whether the supply or demand for credit has been the binding constraint.
In principle, any observed decline in real credit growth rates could reflect three factors-each with distinct policy implications as discussed below. First, banks' ability to lend may be curtailed-both as they try to meet new (or newly enforced) capital adequacy ratios (the "capital crunch") and as withdrawals of bank deposits shrink banking system liabilities in real terms. Second, banks' willingness to lend might fall if weakening economic activity makes lending too risky (with interest rates inadequate to compensate for the risk). Third, in the context of bankrupticies, and weakening aggregate demand and activity, credit demand might fall as well. The disequilibrium framework adopted here (together with the capital crunch constraint) allows for each of these possibilities to be distinguished.
Several important points emerge from the analysis.
First, there are dynamics associated with a credit crunch. In the immediate aftermath of the crisis, there is evidence of a sizable credit crunch-that is, over and above increases in interest rates, there is evidence of quantity rationing. However, as corporate bankruptcies rose, and aggregate demand declined, leading to a deepening recession and worsening economic prospects, the demand for credit also declined. In both countries, the decline in the demand for credit outpaced the decline in the supply of credit (at the aggregate level) by the first quarter of 1998 6 .
Nonetheless, as noted, the supply of credit in both countries was considerably lower post-crisis. The decline in supply of credit that took place can be attributable to both a) a decline in banks' lending capacity and b) a decline in their willingness to lend because of perceptions of increased borrower risk. As mentioned, in principle, the lending capacity of banks can be constrained either because of insufficient liquidity or, when existing capital is below capital adequacy, by insufficient capital. Lack of liquidity though was not an issue, given the large increase infusions by Bank Indonesia and the Bank of Korea-rather the scarcity of capital was the principal factor underlying the decline in banks' lending capacity.
Second, that lending rates did not come down by as much as deposit ratesdespite the fact that, at the aggregate level, the demand for real credit was lower than supply by the first quarter of 1998-indicates that there was risk premium making lending rates downwardly sticky 7 . As long as risk perceptions persist, lending rates would remain relatively high, even if there were no credit rationing.
These findings have implications for the sequencing and priorities for macroeconomic policy. In particular, while once the (lack of) demand for credit becomes the binding constraint-reflecting deteriorating macroeconomic conditions-reflationary fiscal policy will have a much more important role to play. With poor earnings prospects, firms are unlikely to use the credit, even if this credit were made available 8 .
Fiscal policy could also help reduce the risk premium and hence lending rates. While there may be scope for continued loosening of monetary policy-to the extent that does not jeopardize exchange rate stability in a post-crisis situation-in, and of itself, monetary policy would likely to have a limited impact in lowering lending rates at that juncture. Continued and sustained declines in interest rates facing corporates would depend very much on progress made on the structural front, and to the extent that fiscal policy is successful in exerting reflationary pressures and improving the earnings prospects of firms, fiscal policy could also help.
Once the recovery process is underway, however, there may be a period during which the demand for credit may outpace the increase in the supply of creditparticularly if many financial institutions are still struggling to meet prudential regulations. This requires close monitoring of the capital adequacy of financial institutions, to prevent the occurrence of a "credit crunch" as the demand for credit picks up, which could otherwise jeopardize the recovery process.
demand for loans, banks were having difficulty in managing their extra funds and increasingly investing their excess funds in bonds and securities" (reported in Korea Herald, March 17, 1999) . 7 In Korea for example, lending rates were found to have incorporate a risk premium that was strongly correlated with macroeconomic developments as well as events and perceptions regarding the financial and corporate sectors during November 1997-April 1998 (Ghosh, S. 1998) . 8 To the extent that certain borrowers/sectors (e.g. SMEs) face a credit crunch or quantity rationing, specific schemes need to be designed to ensure their adequacy and efficacy. For evidence on the impact on SMEs, see Domac I. and G. Ferri (1998) 
